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The Freedom of the Seas in History, Law, and Politics. By Pitman B. Potter.
New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1924. pp. xvi, 299.
When the Academie de Droit International began its career at the Hague in
the summer of 1923, it was a matter of some amusement to the students to note
the opening phrases which marked almost every lecturer's first appearance. The
lectures covered a great variety of subjects but each was characterized in almost
identic language as "tres interessante, tres importante, et tres vaste." Thus Mr.
Potter. In the preface to his Freedom of the Seas he remarks; "The subject
itself is one of the two or three most vital and profound questions of international
political and legal principle, being rivaled in interest and importance only by the
question of the balance of power." But Mr. Potter's statement contains little
exaggeration. As a natural consequence the subject of which he treats is and
has been highly controversial. In the compass of a small book it was naturally
impossible to dispose satisfactorily of all points involved. It seems unfortunate,
however, from some points of view, that the author has devoted so much space
to antiquity, and one feels th*at much of the time devoted in the tenth and eleventh
chapters to the classification of continental and maritime states might better have
been devoted to other portions of the text. It is not intended to disparage the
scholarly historical treatment which occupies the first five chapters. Probably
there is no other such treatment in the English language at once so compact and
so ample. In an hour's time the student may catch a panorama of the legal and
political history of the seas and particularly derive a thorough understanding of
the famous Grotius-Selden controversy which is admirably analyzed. Neverthe-
less, in a small volume not exclusively devoted to the historical aspect, it is perhaps
unnecessary to quote and note at such length the utterances of Herodotus,
Diodorus Siculus, Quintus Curtius, Philostratus, and so on. Especially is this
true when the majority of these references may be found in such secondary sources
as Miiller-Jochmus, Phillipson, Grotius, and Selden, to whom also the author
makes frequent citation. When the modern law of the sea is discussed in chapters
six through nine, the author is content to refer in a general way to Hall, Hyde,
Bonfils, de Louter, and a few others.
Chapter II on "The Discussion in Antiquity" is concerned with establishing the
theme that the Greeks and Romans did not envisage the concept of a de jure pro-
prietorship of the sea, but merely had in mind domination de facto. It is demon-
strated that the advanced legal concepts of the Corpus lurfs were not accepted in
the practice of the Roman State. Mr. Potter emphasizes the fact that with the
Mediterranean practically a Roman lake-"inare nostrum"--there was small need
for an international sea law, and he well argues that when the Institutes say the
sea is common to all men, they mean common to all the citizens of Rome and not
the object of personal property rights. The distinction drawn is interesting and
certainly less pedagogic than those drawn by a certain legal writer on another
subject who remarked that the distinctions which he drew seemed "to be of more
than a mere academic importance for the reason that they show the fundamental
impossibility of a reconciliation of the purely philosophic and legal conceptions of
the ius naturale." One point upon which the reader could wish Mr. Potter had
dwelt at greater length is passed over quickly: the author says; "There is a
significant lack of evidence in the treaties concluded among the Greek city-states
of any formal recognition of sea-dominion," but we are not told just how far the
evidence does go.
In the middle ages Mr. Potter reveals the genesis of a true international legal
concept of the control of the seas. He cites an interesting arbitration of the 13th
century in which the Bishop of Nervosia as arbitrator decided that the Venetians
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properly claimed authority over the Adriatic, a claim disputed by the people of
Ancona. One may question the author's statement that "The Danes claimed
dominion in the Baltic-a claim never extinguished in principle to this day." Such
a statement seems to fail to take into account the Convention of April ii, 1857
between the United States and Denmark by which Denmark surrendered her claim
to the collection of the sound dues which she had so long exacted.1
It might have been expected that a book which discusses so many theories of
maritime dominion would have commented upon the question so dear to the hearts
of many continental writers-especially perhaps to M. de Lapradelle-whether the
sea is res communis or res nullius. In intricate analytical thought the point is
sometimes important. For example, in discussing the right of *self-protection or
self-preservation outside territorial waters, it has been argued that since a nation
may invade the contiguous territory of another state it may a fortiori invade the
sea which is the property of no state, i. e., res nullius. But if the sea is the prop-
erty of all states, res communis, the argument loses much of its force. However,
Mr. Potter neglects both M. de Lapradelle and his pet theory. There is an excellent
summary- of the status of the controversy before the Grotius-Selden debate marked
a new stage in the history of the freedom of the seas: "At the end of the sixteenth
century there arose from all quarters demands for national dominion over the sea,
for authority at sea over peaceful merchant vessels, over pirates, over merchant
vessels in time of war, over fishermen aid all who used the sea. On the other side
arose the objections of the civilians and the philosophers, declaring.that the sea was
free by natural law and that no man and no nation could deny men the use of
nature's highway in any degree or manner."'
One of the most admirable features of the book is the analysis of the famous
conflict between Hugo de Groot and John Selden, The author tells us in his
preface that he devoted much study to this "battle of the books" while a Ph.D.
student at Harvard. Those who are wont to consider Grotius a pedantic old fossil
petrified in some antedeluvian stratum of metaphysical thought, will be interested to
read how the Mare Liberum grew out of a brief prepared by Grotius, the practicing
attorney in behalf of his client, the Dutch East India Company, in a case before
the Dutch admiralty court. The reader may be a little puzzled by the failure
to reconcile the statements of Elizabeth and Selden: the former in i58o said to
Mendoza, a Spanish envoy, that "the use of the sea and air is common to all, nor
can a title to the ocean belong to any people or private persons, forasmuch as
neither nature nor public use and custom permit any possession thereof"; Selden,
of course, argued directly contra.
With Chapter VI on the "Law of Territorial Waters," Mr. Potter opens his
discussion of modern international law. It is believed to be unfortunate that the
author considers treaties to be among the "only ..... .reliable records of general
and persistent practice (which) can be accepted as infallible guides" in detecting
"official international agreement." The great English scholar Hall in the intro-
ductory chapter to his treatise on international law has convincingly demonstrated
the limitations upon the value of such proof when an attempt is made to draw on
isolated bilateral conventions. Mr. Potter properly accept the three mile limit as
the present rule of international law. Had the publication of his book been
delayed a few months, he would have been able to emphasize his point by a refer-
ence to the nine treaties concluded by the United States with foreign nations for
the suppression of rum smuggling, wherein the contracting parties explicitly
affirm the three mile limit." Although Jefferson is commonly credited with trans-
' See I Moore, Digest of International Law (igo6), pp. 659-663 and notes.
'Compare the statement of Mr. Elihu Root in XI North Atlantic Fisheries Arbi-
tration, p. 20o6.
'Such treaties with Great Britain, Norway, Germany, Sweden, Denmark and
Italy, are now in force and others have been signed with Panama, the Netherlands,
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lating Bynkershoek's norm of cannon range into three miles, Mr. Potter ascribes
it-without any definite citation-to Galiani. The present writer would take issue
with the author's statement that the right of innocent passage is evidence that a
state's authority over its territorial waters is something less than that exercised
over the land. The right of innocent passage is a servitude, a ins in re aliena,
presupposing the ownership of a dominnt tenement, and not inconsistent with-full
sovereignty.' Although a foreign ship cannot be denied this right in time of
peace, neither can a foreign ambassador be denied immunities from the state's
jurisdiction on land. In common with most writers, Mr. Potter here includes a
discussion of international rivers, although their connection with the problems of
the high seas is at best problematical. However, one misses from the discussion
any reference to the Barcelona Conference and the important conventions resulting
from it.
In discussing the Law of War at Sea, Mr. Potter is most vulnerable. As has
been noted above, his citations in this part of the book are of the most general
and vague kind. The author categorically enunciates rules of law on the most
controversial topics without argument and almost without proof. For example,
Mr. Potter affirms the right to convert merchant vessels on the high seas, a posi-
tion which has indeed been supported by some continentalists but emphatically
denied by the United States and by the Institute. A study of the footnote refer-
ences to Hyde and to the Annuaire of the Institute would bring out these facts,
but the text does not elaborate nor indicate to the reader that the cited section
i8i of Hall contains the statement that at the Hague Conference of igo7 "it
was admitted by all that there was no existing rule on the subject" and that no
agreement was reached. One may also contrast the statements in the text
relative to war zones and armed merchantmen with the differing views of Hyde
in sections cited in the notes. The author devotes a separate chapter to the effect
of the "World War"-a chapter which on the whole seems sound and judicious.
Nevertheless, he does say: "In the face of the general character of modern war and
of state control of food and other commodities, the distinction between absolute
contraband, conditional contraband and non-contraband becomes meaningless,"
and he suggests also that the distinction between combatants and non-combatants
is no longer sound. In rebuttal one need only refer to the titular essay of Judge
John Bassett Moore's recent book, "International Law and Some Current Illu-
sions," recently reviewed in this Journal.
As has been indicated above, there are two chapters which analyze the political
problem of the freedom of the seas. The analysis is based on an attempted dis-
tinction between continental and maritime states. Pages are consumed in proving
the self-evident fact that no state is exclusively continental or exclusively mari-
time. Of course Great Britain is taken as the typical maritime power, but the
author experiences some difficulty when he classifies the United States as a con-
tinental power, in fact he later cofriments on the "similar geographical situations
and economic interests" of the United States and Great Britain. In analyzing the
attitude of the continental and maritime states towards the laws of naval warfare,
Mr. Potter might more properly have classified the interests of neutrals and
belligerents, and indeed in a few pages we find a sudden and unexplained shift in
and France. The first article of each of these treaties reads: "The high contract-
ing parties declare that it is their firm intention to uphold the principle that three
marine miles ....... constitute the proper limits of territorial waters." By
identic repetition, these treaties have taken on the nature and effect of multilateral
conventions and would probably be accepted even by Hall as evidence of the rule
of law.
'See I Moore, op. cit. p. i9.
'Compare the prophetic statement of Hall in the last sentence to the preface of
his third edition, written in i889.
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terminology from "continental" to "neutral." Obviously the terms can not always
be synonymous and the author's original classification- breaks down. In an attempt
to support it he is forced to argue that "the continental counts upon being neutral
in time of war-or at least in time of naval war I"
The concluding chapter is entitled "The Solution of the Problem." Mr. Potter
declares his position with almost brutal frankness: "What we are dealing with
is the needs, the interests, the actual sea power and naval policy of Great
Britain ..... .When one questions and discusses sea power and sea freedom
does not one in those very ideas call in question Britain herself ?" In discussing
this "British fact" as the author calls it, he adds that "it may be better to tolerate
an existing and therefore well known, national maritime domination, rather than
to destroy it in such circumstances as to allow it to be replaced by the unknown
domination of another state, more likely, perhaps, to abuse such power." Mr.
Potter considers and discards the suggestion that the United States should join
with Great *Britain in claiming by force of their combined fleets the complete
sovereignty of the seas. He believes the solution lies in Anglo-American co6pera-
tion under the League of Nations whereby "the Anglo-Saxon navy would be the
policeman of the seas by universal appointment"
Mr. Potter faces his problem with no illusions. He sees a warring world in
which the nation having the power determines what the rule of law shall be. ' He
sees Germany racing to wrest sea power from Great Britain and the United States
gradually climbing to balance the scales and to receive a British acknowledgment
of the fact in the 5-5-3 treaty of the Washington Conference. Whether or no one
agrees with the proffered solution, Mr. Potter's book frames the problems so that
they are obvious to all. This in itself is no small service. The utility of the
volume is enhanced by an index and a large bibliographical appendix. American
literature on international maritime law is all too scanty and Mr. Potter's book
forms a welcome addition thereto. It is to be hoped that he will later give us a
new edition which will change too brief a treatise into a more complete reference
book for the international lawyer. PHILIP C. JESSUP
Washington, D. C.
Constitutional Doctrines of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. By Dorsey Richard-
son, Ph.D. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1924. pp. io3.
I do not know whether Dr. Richardson is an accredited lawyer, nor is the fact
material. He has done a lawyer-like job, careful and balanced. He has, more-
over, earnestly attempted to set Justice Holmes' opinions against the background
of Justice Holmes' philosophy of law. About half the little book is taken up with
a short biographical preface and an attempt to make clear the conception of law,
private and constitutional, and of the judicial function, which is mirrored in the
work of our greatest living jurist. Twenty pages follow on the Commerce Clause,
and a little less on the Fourteenth and th6 first eight of the amendments, respec-
tively. The author conceives the Commerce Clause as the source of a federal
police power, and thus deals largely with the extent of the police power of state
and nation and their adjustment to each other and the individiual.
The outstanding feature of the cases discussion is the careful presentation,
wherever Justice Holmes dissented, of the majority opinion; this is, indeed, the
major value of the book as a book. Something of the sweep of Justice Holmes'
philosophy, not only of law but of life, his fearless honesty of thought, his rigorous
insistence on "thinking things, not words," his glorious power of making words
leap into life and pulse with the thought beneath the skin-this we already have,
and perhaps have better, in the articles of Wigmore (29 HARv. L. Ray.
6oi) and Frankfurter (29 HARv. L. REV. 683, 36 HARV. L. Rav. 909). But
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Professor Frankfurter sacrificed both perspective and flavor by limiting his
discussions to the opinions of the one man.
Dr. Richardson goes somewhat further than his predecessors in attempting to
pigeonhole Justice Holmes' doctrines; this is done without dogmatism; except in
the broadest outline, it is done without notable success. Perhaps only their
originator is equal to the task. In particular, the suggestion (p. 23) that "Justice
Holmes is inclined to find the guarantee of adjective rights to be more rigid than
those of substantive rights," may have some point. But as applied to a man who
sees rights only as they are effective in the voice and predictable action of an
objectively real official, the distinction cannot be pushed too far. The dissents in
Bailey v. Alabama and the Abrams Case are, I believe, to be reconciled, but along
no such line as that. Their reconciliation lies rather in that fundamental charac-
teristic of the great judge to which the author does fine justice: tolerance; belief
in experiment, even where society's experiment of the moment may seem to him
dubious or dangerous or loathsome.
Indeed, one may wonder whether here is not one philosophy of government which
Justice Holmes has read into the Constitution, into which, in his view, philosophies
of government are never to be read. His vigilance for the rights of individuals
has found its limits where they were urged to shackle free experiment of the
state; his vigilance for the powers of the state became a vigilance against them,
when they threatened to put down that individual experiment in action and opinion
without which the cumbrous engine of government must run down.
It is a pleasure to note that Dr. Richardson not only appreciates and stresses
this quality in Justice Holmes, but displays much of .it himself in dealing not only
with those opinions of the Justice with which he disagrees, but with majority
opinions which, if he had a wishing-cap, would be dissents.
K. N. LLEWELLYz;
Yale Law School
Cases on the Law of Public Service, Including the Law Peculiar to Common Car-
riers and Innkeepers. By Charles K. Burdick. Boston, Little, Brown and Com-
pany, 1924. pp. xxii, 738.
Among the reviews, almost uniformly appreciative, of the first edition of this
valuable casebook, was one which regretted the departure -of the inclusive and
scholarly casebook of the Ames type and the substitution of "course" casebooks
designed primarily as practical tools for use in a particular course. (29 HAv. L.
REv. 891.) It is hardly a complete characterization of this book to consider it as
merely a trade tool. Yet it is true that it is designed primarily for teaching pur-
poses and not as a text of the subject. The reviewer regards this as not a defect
but an especial merit of the present casebook, which has proven eminently useful
in course work. There are probably all sorts of tastes in casebooks but it is
thought that the day of the treatise casebook is over. Such a work is not adequate
as a treatise and it is not in accord with our thorough-going modern belief in the
case system of education. In fact it represented a compromise and a transition
from the textbook method of instruction. On this view the notes should be
designed, not as complete delineations of topics, but as suggestive only, pointing
out opposing views or additional lines of development of the subject. Professor
Burdick's notes well fulfill such a purpose and are particularly commendable for
their adequate citation of recent law journal material.
The first edition contained no. case material, dealing specifically with carriers
and innkeepers, their extraordinary liability, and the limitation thereof. Hence,
unless a separate course in carriers was contemplated, the work was incomplete.
This defect has here been remedied by the inclusion of almost two hundred pages
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of such material, making it possible to organize the course on the basis of three
hours a week for half a year.
It is refreshing to see a new edition of a casebook where the material previously
used is subjected to a thorough-going revision. So often we find a new edition
to mean merely the substitution here and there of one short case for another. The
subject of rate-making is vastly better treated in this edition than in the former
one. As to the matter of withdrawal from the public service, also completely
revised, the reviewer is not clear that even as yet an orderly and logical arrange-
ment of the material has been attained. A serious, and it is thought inexcusable,
defect in the former edition, the failure to note omissions of portions of the
reported cases, has been corrected. About the choice of particular cases there is
always opportunity for dispute. Certain omissions, however, seem very strange.
Thus from the material on Legislation as a Basis of Public Services duties there
is omitted the quite important case of Wolff Packing Company v. Court of Indus-
trial Relations of Kas. (1923, 262 U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct 63o) ; while in connection
with the Limitations of the Carriers' Common Law Liability, the subject of
released rates is treated only in Kansas City Southern Railway Company v. Carl
(227 U. S. 639, 33 Sup. Ct. 391) decided in 1913, and the recent developments
including the Cummins Amendments of 1915 and 1916 and culminating in the case
of Atmerican Ry. Express Co. v. Ludenburg (1923, 250 U. S. 584, 43 Sup. Ct. 206)
are not made available in the book.
It may now be said that at last we have adequate material for a comparatively
brief course in public service law. With the modem stress on the functional
aspect of law, perhaps we may need to revaluate the subject and to decide if we
are giving sufficient time to it, in view of the importance of the functions of public
utilities and transportation agencies in modem life. We have to contend with the
usual difficulty of the overcrowded curriculum. Furthermore, law students with an
adequate preliminary education should be already somewhat familiar with the
economic phases of transportation. And while the cases deal with profound
questions of social policy, as yet unsolved, the cases on the whole are comparatively
easy for the law student to master in their technical legal aspects. The tendency
is therefore to compress this work, and in consequence to lessen the emphasis upon
its social and economic phases. This is contrary to the modem spirit of legal
education and cannot last. Perhaps the temporary and immediate treatment of the
problem is a general course in Public Service law as covered by this book, and an
advanced course for those specially interested along the line of Professor Frank-
furter's Cases under the Interstate Commerce Act (recently reviewed in this
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